el objetivo de este trabajo es defender que la actual crisis es consecuencia de la inmadurez metodológica de la propia Economía. En la primera parte, se discute con Simon que la Economía no hace predicciones como una ciencia física tal y como considera M. Friedman. En la segunda, siguiendo a K. Popper, se cuestiona que las leyes económicas tengan la capacidad para hacer profecías sobre el futuro y la historia del hombre como creyó K. Marx. Y por último se concluye (...) —tomando como referencia la teoría de la ciencia de Th. Kuhn— que la Economía es una ciencia preparadigmática que no cuenta con los instrumentos necesarios para «cuantificar» la acción humana y, por consiguiente, es incapaz de predecir su comportamiento en términos económicos. (shrink)

El presente artículo analiza la polémica sobre la superación de la metafísica en la filosofía de Heidegger por un lado, y la de Carnap por el otro; pasando por la ambivalente actitud de Wittgenstein. ¿Vivimos realmente en una época postmetafísica? El objetivo del autor es mostrar que nuestra relación con la metafísica tiene que ser crítica y no puede ignorar la filosofía práctica.

https://revistes.uab.cat/enrahonar/article/view/v34-volpi.

Neuropalliative care developed to address the needs of patients living with life‐limiting neurologic disease. One critical consideration is that disease‐related changes to cognition, communication, and function challenge illness experiences and care practices. We conducted an ethnography to understand neuropalliative care as a phenomenon; how it was experienced, provided, conceptualized. Personhood served as our conceptual framework; with its long philosophical history and important place in nursing theory, we examined the extent to which it captured neuropalliative experiences and concerns. Personhood contextualized complex (...) losses, aligning the impact of functional and relational changes. Cognition, communication, and functional alterations stretched conceptions of personhood, insinuating it can be relational, fluid, adaptive. Although normative conceptions of personhood guided research and decision‐making, ethical considerations suggested personhood could be transformed, remade. We consider the implications of our findings through three themes. First, we examine how literature on illness experience fails to integrate the realities of people living with and dying from neurologic disease; we counter this by interrogating the concept of experience. Second, we turn to Ricoeur's work on recognition to illuminate relational conceptions of personhood to inform care practices. Finally, we reflect on how personhood can bridge the gap left by functional changes, enhance relational engagement, and promote dignity at the end of life. (shrink)

In the Protagoras, Plato presents us with a Puzzle regarding the value of interpretation. On the one hand, Socrates claims to find several familiar Socratic theses about morality and the human condition in his interpretation of a poem by Simonides (339e−347a). On the other hand, immediately after the interpretation, Socrates castigates the whole task of interpretation as “childish nonsense” appropriate for second-rate drinking parties (347d5−6).1 The core problem is this: taking Socrates’s interpretation of Simonides seriously requires undermining the significance of (...) the claims about interpretation, but taking the criticism of interpretation seriously requires undermining the significance of Socrates’s .. (shrink)

Dans un travail anterieur j’ai essaye de montrer que Heidegger a finalement refuse de faire place, dans sa philosophie, a la notion platonicienne d’idee, bien qu’elle semblait, selon un certain point de vue, etre une figure capable de representer l’ouverture originelle de l’être qui était au coeur des recherches de Heidegger dans les annees qui entourent Etre et Temps. La raison de cela, a mon avis, est que l’approche aristotelicienne de la philosophie de Platon par Heidegger explicitement adoptee conduisait au (...) bout du compte a interpreter l’idee de Platon comme une substance. Mais qu’en est‑il de l’idee du bien, qui pour sa determination teleologique et pour sa collocation au‑dela de l’ousia d’un cote semblait repondre aux besoins propres a la pensee heideggerienne, et d’un autre cote etait plus refractaire a la substantialisation aristotelicienne? La these que je soutiens est que Heidegger, tout en ayant cultive pour longtemps le projet d’utiliser l’idee du bien comme un precedent important de son ontologie, a finalement decide que ce projet n’etait pas possible, parce que la connotation ethique de cette idee etait largement dominante sur l’aspect ontologique. (shrink)

For several decades now, and for a number of different reasons, there has been a significant reawakening of interest in Aristotle's practical philosophy. In particular it is widely held that his philosophy can work as a model for safeguarding the fundamental ethical demands without having to deny the natural essence of the human being and without having to resort to a metaphysical basis. This article sets out to question this theoretical approach. It considers in particular two main problems: the responsability (...) of the individual and the role of the knowledge of good in ethics. The comparison between two recent publications , is directed towards demonstrating that Aristotle's ethical thought does not meet demands nowadays considered essential. As for responsability, Aristotle succeeds in justifying responsability for actions but not responsability for character: the results are hardly acceptable . With regard to the knowledge of good, it is broadly estabilished that, in his ethics, Aristotle does not consider it to be a central theme . The question is whether the lack of this particular feature is really, as many maintain, a positive characteristic. This paper aims to demonstrate that it is not the case, or at least it is not when evaluating ethical theories from a general current perspective, because nowadays the fundamental ethical problem seems indeed to be the identification of an intersubjective consent on the notions of good and evil. If, in our search for an effective model for modern reflection, we wish to turn our attention to ancient philosophy, then the Socratic/Platonic approach seems to be much more promising than that of Aristotle. (shrink)

Pour Platon l'instrument principal de la connaissance philosophique est le logos, non seulement dans le sens général de « raison », mais aussi dans le sens spécifique de connaissance qui se réalise au moyen du « discours », c'est à dire d'une raison qui possède un caractère foncièrement linguistique. Cela semble impliquer que le logos a une nature entièrement transparente à soi même, et par conséquent, comme on peut le déduire de l'analyse consacrée dans le Théétète à la théorie du (...) songe, que les éléments dont le logos est composé sont pleinement intelligibles et dépourvus de toute opacité. Cependant cette prétention semble échouer dans le Cratyle, où la tentative de montrer l'intelligibilité des éléments du langage, c'est à dire lettres et syllabes, n'est pas couronnée de succès. Une possible solution à ce problème repose sur le fait que les éléments du langage, à la différence des éléments naturels, épuisent entièrement leur nature dans le rôle qu'ils jouent à l'intérieur du langage lui-même ; et donc la connaissance de ce rôle, exactement comme il en est des pièces des échecs, coïncide avec la connaissance de l'objet dans son entier. (shrink)

Pour Platon l'instrument principal de la connaissance philosophique est le logos, non seulement dans le sens général de « raison », mais aussi dans le sens spécifique de connaissance qui se réalise au moyen du « discours », c'est à dire d'une raison qui possède un caractère foncièrement linguistique. Cela semble impliquer que le logos a une nature entièrement transparente à soi même, et par conséquent, comme on peut le déduire de l'analyse consacrée dans le Théétète à la théorie du (...) songe, que les éléments dont le logos est composé sont pleinement intelligibles et dépourvus de toute opacité. Cependant cette prétention semble échouer dans le Cratyle, où la tentative de montrer l'intelligibilité des éléments du langage, c'est à dire lettres et syllabes, n'est pas couronnée de succès. Une possible solution à ce problème repose sur le fait que les éléments du langage, à la différence des éléments naturels, épuisent entièrement leur nature dans le rôle qu'ils jouent à l'intérieur du langage lui-même ; et donc la connaissance de ce rôle, exactement comme il en est des pièces des échecs, coïncide avec la connaissance de l'objet dans son entier. (shrink)

1. _ Doxa _ e _ Logos _ nel _ Teeteto _ Teeteto introduce la sua ultima definizione di _ episteme _, dichiarando di riportare l'opinione di una persona che resta anonima, con queste parole : " « Diceva che l'opinione vera sorretta da spiegazione è conoscenza, mentre quello che ne è privo non vi rientra. Ora, le cose di cui non si dà spiegazione non sono "passibili di conoscenza" - sono parole sue - mentre lo sono quelle per cui (...) una spiegazione è possibile » " La definizione in oggetto intende ovviamente correggere, o meglio integrare, quella precedente. Dire che l'_episteme_ è retta opinione non basta, perché si dà il caso, come emerso poche righe prima tramite l'esempio dei giudici in tribunale, che esista una retta opinione che non sia conoscenza. Se dunque la retta opinione rimane il soggetto base dell'_episteme_, occorre distinguerne almeno due tipi, ossia la retta opinione che non è conoscenza e quella che invece lo è, e contestualmente trovare un criterio per discriminare la prima della seconda. Questo... (shrink)

This work aims to querying what are the limits of philosophical argumentation established by Plato and the distance of those limits in relation to Aristotle’s and later thinkers’ thoughts. The supposition here defended concerns to the fact that, for Plato, what really changes in the argumentations is that the definition becomes delimitation, that the logic replaces rethoric, that the demonstration becomes persuasion, if assumed the hermeneutical links that the thought and the language are subjected to.

This work aims to querying what are the limits of philosophical argumentation established by Plato and the distance of those limits in relation to Aristotle’s and later thinkers’ thoughts. The supposition here defended concerns to the fact that, for Plato, what really changes in the argumentations is that the definition becomes delimitation, that the logic replaces rethoric, that the demonstration becomes persuasion, if assumed the hermeneutical links that the thought and the language are subjected to.

_ Source: _Volume 61, Issue 1, pp 60 - 81 This paper presents an analysis of some passages of Alcinous, _Didaskalikos_ 4. Its aim is to show, on the one hand, that Alcinous suggests a reading of the main points of Plato’s epistemology focused on a hard dualistic interpretation of both the theory of forms and recollection; and, on the other hand, that in the text there is no real acceptance of Stoic doctrines, but only an attempt to show that (...) outside of the Platonic framework no suitable account for Stoic notions such as _logos_ or _physikai ennoiai_ can be provided. (shrink)

Our goal is to prove that the golden section, however important, is not the only key to understand a mathematical-formalizing approach to the idea of beauty. Having developed, from this point of view, reading keys linked to the post-modern, it is necessary to link together the multiple rivulets of knowledge that gather in this direction. Moreover the canons of the approaches presented up to now are very indicative for the understanding of many aspects of beauty, which however depends on the (...) historical moment and the cultures created in the various civilizations. Therefore we can affirm that there is no effective definition of "beauty" that can be codified through fixed canons, but that the concept is expressed by a series of stratifications and interpretations that tend to link several major variations, expressing the various answers given by man to the question: what is the beauty? (shrink)

The present work introduces the neuropsychological paradigm as a new approach to studying ancient literature. In the first part of the article, an epistemological framework for the proper use of neuropsychology in relation to ancient literature is presented. The article then discusses neuropsychological methods of studying different human experiences and dimensions already addressed by ancient literatures. The experiences of human encounters with gods among ancient cultures are first considered, through the contributions of Julian Jaynes and Eric R. Dodds. The concepts (...) of right and left in the Bible, and that of soul are then discussed. Ecstatic experience in Paul of Tarsus is also presented, with a particular focus on glossolalia. Neuroscientific differences between mindful and unitive meditative practices are then described referring to ancient Buddhist literature, and finally a brief description of dreams in ancient Greek literature is proposed. Neuropsychology variously enables a more profound understanding of themes characterizing human experiences that ancient literature has already explored; these investigations prove that the collaboration of neuroscience and humanistic studies can return fruitful and interesting results. (shrink)